Evolutionary biology - or rather, two (alleged) applications of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection, namely evolutionary psychology and so-called human behavioral biology - is on the threshold of the new craze among lawyers seeking interdisciplinary understanding of the law. We argue that the actual science stands today, evolutionary biology offers nothing to with questions about legal regulation of behavior settings. Only systematic misrepresentations or lack of understanding of the relevant biology, together with far-reaching analytical and philosophical confusion led to think of anyone else.
Evolutionary accounts are etiological accounts of how a function is developed. We argue that an account of causal etiology could be relevant to law if (1) the causal account of the cause is scientifically confirmed, and (2) there is an explanation of how well confirmed etiology bears on questions of development (which we call the environmental Gap opt-out). We then show that the accounts of causal reason might be relevant are not remotely well-confirmed by scientific standards. We argue that in particular (a) shall notevolutionary psychology right Selectionists accounts of human behavior to assume, (b) the assumptions that need to be Selectionists accounts is not warranted by standard criteria for theory choice, and (c) only confusion about the level of declarationhuman behavior seems to understand the biology of behavior is important. We also note that no reaction was served on the environmental Gap objections. In the last part of the article, we turn directly to the work of Professor Owen Jones , a leading proponent of the relevance of evolutionary biology to law and shows that he did not identify the confrontation with one of the fundamental problems in this article
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